XXX v. People; G.R. No. 232190; Second Division, August 12, 2025

Overview:

The case stemmed from a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 filed by the accused, seeking to overturn the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals which reversed his acquittal and found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004. The charge against him was anchored on allegations that, during the subsistence of his marriage, he engaged in marital infidelity by maintaining a relationship with another woman, with whom he fathered two children, and that such conduct caused psychological violence in the form of mental and emotional anguish to his lawful wife.

Facts:

The factual antecedents reveal that the accused and the complainant were legally married and had one child together. During the course of their marriage, the complainant began to suspect that the accused was having an extramarital affair after discovering suspicious messages on his phone. Despite her initial hope that he would change, the accused eventually left the conjugal home and ceased cohabitation with her, maintaining only occasional contact with their child. It was later discovered that he had established a separate family with another woman, with whom he fathered two children. More significantly, he publicly displayed this illicit relationship through social media posts, including photographs and celebratory messages involving his paramour and their children. The complainant testified that these acts caused her profound emotional distress, humiliation, and mental suffering, which were later clinically assessed as depression or dysthymia by a psychiatrist.

In contrast, the defense attempted to attribute the breakdown of the marriage to the complainant’s alleged immaturity and overdependence on her family. The accused claimed that he was compelled to leave the conjugal home due to conflicts with his mother-in-law and that he exerted efforts to reconcile, including proposing counseling, which the complainant allegedly refused. He further asserted that the criminal complaint was motivated by disputes over their child’s schooling and financial support, rather than genuine psychological harm.

The Regional Trial Court rendered a judgment of acquittal, holding that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court gave weight to circumstances such as the delay in filing the complaint, the continued communication and financial support extended by the accused to his child, and the allegedly amicable relations between the parties after separation. It further considered the psychiatric evaluation as insufficiently persuasive, given that it was conducted several years after the alleged acts. Ultimately, the trial court concluded that the parties’ separation was a natural consequence of irreconcilable differences rather than criminal psychological violence.

On petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Court of Appeals reversed the acquittal, finding that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion. The appellate court ruled that the evidence on record clearly established that the accused engaged in marital infidelity and that his acts, particularly the public display of his illicit relationship, constituted psychological violence under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. It held that such conduct demonstrated a blatant disregard for the complainant’s dignity and emotional well-being, thereby causing her mental anguish as supported by both testimonial and documentary evidence, including the psychiatric evaluation.

Ruling:

Elevated to the Supreme Court, the accused argued that the Rule 65 petition filed by the People violated his constitutional right against double jeopardy, emphasizing that a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. He further maintained that the prosecution failed to establish the essential elements of psychological violence and that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the conviction, subject to a modification of the penalty. On the procedural issue, the Court categorically ruled that the right against double jeopardy was not violated. It reiterated the settled doctrine that while judgments of acquittal are generally final and unappealable, they may nonetheless be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 when the acquittal is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In this case, the Court found that the trial court gravely abused its discretion by disregarding material evidence and by misapplying the law, particularly in concluding that marital infidelity committed after de facto separation falls outside the ambit of Republic Act No. 9262. Such misappreciation was deemed so patent and fundamental as to render the acquittal void.

On the substantive issue, the Court held that all the elements of psychological violence under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 were duly established beyond reasonable doubt. It emphasized that psychological violence includes acts or omissions that cause mental or emotional suffering, and that the law expressly recognizes marital infidelity as one of its forms. The Court found that the accused’s extramarital affair was clearly proven by documentary evidence, including the birth certificates of his children with another woman and social media posts openly displaying their relationship. Notably, the accused himself did not deny the existence of the affair.

The Court further ruled that the complainant’s mental and emotional suffering was sufficiently established through her testimony and corroborated by psychiatric findings. The evaluation detailed symptoms such as depression, feelings of worthlessness, social withdrawal, and emotional distress, all of which were attributed to the accused’s abandonment and infidelity. The Court clarified that the law does not require proof that the victim developed a clinical psychological disorder; it is sufficient that emotional anguish or mental suffering is proven. Moreover, the Court held that the timing of the psychiatric consultation does not negate the existence of suffering, as it merely confirmed a condition that had already manifested earlier.

Importantly, the Court rejected the notion that de facto separation negates liability under Republic Act No. 9262. It stressed that marriage subsists despite physical separation, and that marital obligations, including fidelity, remain in force. Consequently, acts of infidelity committed even after separation may still constitute psychological violence if they cause emotional harm to the spouse.

The Court likewise underscored that in cases of marital infidelity, the requirement of intent to cause emotional suffering is effectively satisfied by the nature of the act itself. Infidelity, by its very nature, is inherently injurious and is expected to cause emotional pain to the aggrieved spouse. Thus, the accused could not evade liability by invoking alleged good intentions or by pointing to his continued support for his child.

In view of the foregoing, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the accused for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. It sustained the indeterminate sentence imposed by the Court of Appeals but modified the fine from ₱300,000.00 to ₱100,000.00 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. The accused was likewise ordered to undergo mandatory psychological counseling and to report compliance to the court.

In sum, the decision is a definitive pronouncement that marital infidelity, when attended by circumstances that cause mental and emotional suffering, constitutes psychological violence punishable under Republic Act No. 9262. It also reinforces the doctrine that acquittals rendered with grave abuse of discretion may be reviewed through certiorari without violating the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy, thereby ensuring that manifest errors in the application of law do not escape judicial correction.